In Japan studying declassified documents about the fate of the South Kuril Islands, from which it follows that the sabotage of the United States against the Soviet Union turned to advantage for Russia. If Khrushchev was able to implement its plan, the Soviet Union lost control over part of the disputed territories. However, to blame him for this plan is not necessary, and here’s why.
John DULLES in Russia I remember is much worse than his younger brother Allen, head of the CIA. But in vain: the man he is outstanding.
DULLES-the senior was not just a Secretary of state – the executor of the will of President Eisenhower. In fact, he determined U.S. foreign policy, acting on behalf of the head of state and using his unlimited confidence. Like his brother, he has nothing to do with the “DULLES plan” is a historical fake, but was a co-author of the Marshall plan, one of the founders of NATO and a key architect of the cold war.
The Secretary looked at the world the way that “peacefully coexist” on the same planet with the Soviet Union impossible. Only the struggle, only large-scale confrontation, but constant balancing on the brink of armed conflict, and if you don’t like something, there’s the door – policy is not for cowards.
According to the documents, declassified by the Japanese foreign Ministry, it was DULLES, in 1956, is strictly forbidden Tokyo to go to any compromise with the Soviet Union, using the fact that the sovereignty of Japan in those years was a solid decoration.
For us all this is no revelation – the circumstances of the ultimatum known, known and the essence of American blackmail: if Tokyo agrees to sign a peace Treaty with Moscow and shared with her the disputed Islands, it will lose Okinawa, occupied by the American army. That the ocean might of the United States paid for by the suffering of its people – of the Ryukyus, the newspaper VIEW wrote previously.
However, in Japan itself the subject tried once again not to pedal, because America – the main ally and protector, occupied Okinawa to Japanese sake. Responsible for the failure in the settlement of the Kuril issue certainly will not add US popular, and so is left little.
But from the point of view of Russia’s territorial integrity, Washington, wanting to hurt us, actually helped us. If not for the intervention of DULLES, the Habomai archipelago and Shikotan island will likely be managed now from Tokyo.
In the same 1956 signed the so-called Moscow Declaration, according to which the Soviet Union conceded to Japan the land in exchange for a peace Treaty and the renunciation of claims to Iturup and Kunashir. Modern Russia this Declaration recognizes, but for the Japanese it is not critical: they do not agree on the part of the South Kuril Islands, they brought up the dream to return all the “Northern territories”.
The very acceptance of such a compromise in the middle of 1950-ies puts Nikita Khrushchev in the traditionally negative for the light: the voluntarist-maize gave the Crimea, would give and a part of the Kuril Islands, if it weren’t for the Americans and contrary to expectation we did not help. But this assessment is unfair – Khrushchev there had been valid grounds in order to obtain from the Japanese neighbourhood.
Immediately after Stalin’s death relations between the USSR and the Maoist China began to deteriorate rapidly. The border between the two red States had not been resolved and, according to the most pessimistic forecasts, it could reach a full-fledged war, and the Chinese have territorial claims to us was much more significant than the Japanese.
Just as in China began to pedalirovanija revisionist concept of non-recognition of “unequal treaties” concluded by China in the XVIII-XIX centuries under the pressure of the great powers. Thanks to one of these, Russia at the time, took the Amur region.
In such hands, Moscow had an obvious reason for a rapprochement with Tokyo as the chief enemy of Beijing. Otherwise, on their Eastern frontier threatened to be in the ring sharply hostile countries net except North Korea. Hence the compromise of the Moscow Declaration and assignment in the form of Habomai and Shikotan is not equal to key: significantly larger and more elongated Kunashir and Iturup Moscow were left behind (archipelago Habomai, by the way, during the Soviet era has become uninhabitable and remains so to this day, except for the guards).
The border conflict on damanskii, when the attack of Chinese 58 Soviet military personnel were killed and 94 injured, fully confirmed bespochvennosti concerns Khrushchev’s Moscow. It is not surprising that shortly after bloody battles have already Brezhnev’s power thought of the Moscow Declaration and invited the Japanese to return to it, adding a couple of new conditions – for example, guarantee free passage of Soviet ships.
The Soviet Ambassador to Japan Oleg Troyanovsky recalled: “the Visit of Gromyko to Japan in 1972 was held in the atmosphere primarily because our foreign Minister arrived with a small gift – a statement about the readiness of the USSR to transfer two of the four Islands claimed by Japan… Speaking at the Banquet in honor of the Soviet guest, then Minister of foreign Affairs of Japan Takeo Fukuda even said that if before Gromyko was known in Japan as “Mr. No”, then now it should be called “Mr. Yeah”. However, later in a private conversation with me Fukuda stated explicitly that the two Islands is not enough.”
A chance for rapprochement was lost in the 1950s. Weakened, humiliated, occupied, surrounded by enemies, Japan could compromise, but in the 1970s it has experienced an economic boom, has regained a significant part of sovereignty and soaked a new recension of patriotism, which by definition are not assumed section Smoked. The Japanese so persistently explained why to make concessions in relations with the USSR is impossible that they fully believed in it, making the “Northern territories” the subject of worship, continue to share the absolute majority.
The historical irony is that the diplomatic deadlock that Moscow and Tokyo were brought by the Americans, means control of the Russian Federation over all the Southern Kurils. The Japanese are no longer ready for their responsibility, and we are not ready to go on the Moscow Declaration. That is the situation, on the one hand, a stalemate on the stalemate in our favor, the benefit of modern China is not a potential enemy, but a strategic ally, and now the Japanese have much more reason to search for compromise with the Russians than the Russians have to compromise with the Japanese.
In a sense, Americans can even say thanks for what they torpedoed the Moscow Declaration – acutely relevant then and mostly formal now. If they were really part of that power which wills evil but does good.
Photo: Vladimir Savostyanov/TASS photo chronicle
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