Antony Blinken traveled to China this week to warn Beijing about sanctions for supplying military technology to Russia, according to the Financial Times and Bloomberg in their previews of the US secretary of state’s visit.
They didn’t specify which sanctions might follow, although FT sources suggested that financial and other institutions in China could face restrictions. Meanwhile, the Izvestia newspaper has revealed that several Chinese banks, including the largest, ICBC, are already not accepting payments in yuan from Russia, for fear of secondary sanctions. Almost 80% of payments to China have been returned, the newspaper claimed.
Washington is apparently convinced that China’s support for the Russian defense industry, although not publicized, is genuine and that this is having a significant impact on the course of the Ukraine conflict.
Even with all this in mind, it was hard to imagine that Blinken would communicate in the language of threats and ultimatums. The first experience of this type of rhetoric between the administration of US President Joe Biden and the Chinese showed that hard and fast pressure does not work with the current leadership in Beijing.
In fact, it has the opposite effect. Proof of this was the failed meeting in Alaska in March 2021, when Blinken and National Security adviser Jake Sullivan tried to pressure their Chinese counterparts, only to be met with a harsh rebuke – and a public one at that – which was a far cry from the spirit of Beijing’s traditionally restrained diplomacy.
Blinken subsequently adopted a much more subtle game. He likely tried to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing by exploiting the fact that China’s peace initiatives to resolve the Ukraine conflict do not match the maximalist demands of Russian officials (at least in public).